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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SURVEY

INTRODUCTION

During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit gave continuing constitutional definition to the area of criminal procedure. While these
changes were not drastic, the court offered further insight in the areas of
excessive force, competency to stand trial, delay in appeal, search and
seizure, and double jeopardy. Each of these changes is analyzed to provide the practitioner with an update on the developments in the circuit,
and the impact of these changes on earlier case precedent.

I.

EXCESSIVE FORCE

In 1991, the Tenth Circuit decided several cases on the issue of excessive force, most of which affirmed existing principles of constitutional
law and criminal procedure. Prior to this year, there was no standard
applicable to all excessive force claims' and defenses of qualified immunity. During the survey period, however, the Tenth Circuit set forth the
standard applicable at each point while the defendant is in police
2
custody.
In Austin v. Hamilton,3 plaintiffs brought a Bivens action 4 against federal agents claiming use of excessive force during their arrest and subsequent detention and lack of probable cause. Defendants urged qualified
immunity. The district court, however, rejected the defense and denied
defendants' motion for summary judgment. This case is significant to
the Tenth Circuit because it explicitly identifies the constitutional stan1. Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1990).
2. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
3. 945 F.2d 1155 (10th Cir. 1991).
4. Bivens actions involve individual plaintiffs alleging that federal agents used unnecessary or excessive force to accomplish an unwarranted arrest or subsequent detention.
This type of action was given impetus by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), in which the Court awarded damages to plaintiff
for a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. In 1974, Congress responded to the Bivens decision by extending the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1988), to
claims arising out of acts or omissions of law enforcement officers of the United States,
including claims of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest and malicious prosecution. However, in 1980, the Supreme Court held that Congress did not intend to extinguish Bivens actions, which are based on constitutional violations. Carlson v. Green, 446
U.S. 14 (1980). In Carlson, the Court held that Congress intended the FTCA and Bivens to
provide "parallel, complementary causes of action." Id. at 20. The Court concluded:
After the date of the enactment of [the FTCA], innocent individuals who are subjected to raids [like that in Bivens] will have a cause of action against the individual
federal agents and the Federal Government. Furthermore, this provision should
be viewed as a counterpart to the Bivens case and its progenty [sic], in that it
waives the defense of sovereign immunity so as to make the government independently liable in damages for the same type of conduct that is allegedly to have
occurred in Bivens.
Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 700, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789, 2791).
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dards to be used in evaluating a qualified immunity defense. 5 Before
Austin, the court "simply affirmed a district court's ruling on qualified
immunity without explicitly identifying the constitutional standard by
which the federal agent's actions should be measured." 6
In connection with defendants' motion for summary judgment,
both parties submitted affidavits containing widely differing accounts of
defendants' search, seizure and detention of plaintiffs at a port of entry
into the United States from Mexico. 7 Plaintiffs' affidavit told of a twelvehour ordeal of unnecessary physical violence and inhumane treatment,
ending in their release without charge. Plaintiffs alleged that after a
small amount of marijuana was seized from their automobile, they were
taken to the port of entry office, handcuffed despite their cooperation,
and repeatedly assaulted without provocation; and, that on three occasions at least one of the plaintiffs was beaten and knocked to the floor
unconscious. Plaintiffs also alleged that their handcuffs were tightened
beyond the point of feeling and that they were denied the use of restroom facilities. 8 Defendants, on the other hand, stated that all measures
were taken in response to "two unruly and abusive detainees." 9 Plaintiffs alleged two distinct claims pursuant to Bivens: l 0 use of excessive
force during arrest and subsequent detention and detention following a
warrantless arrest for an unreasonable duration without a probable
cause determination by a judicial officer. The district court disallowed
defendants' qualified immunity defense, holding that such a defense
would not lie considering the type of conduct alleged.
Reviewing the district court's denial of summary judgment de
novo I1 and construing the affidavits in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs, 1 2 the court of appeals held that defendants' alleged conduct
might have violated plaintiffs' substantive due process and Fourth
Amendment rights.' 3 Moreover, the court held, granting qualified immunity on summary judgment would be inappropriate because the fac14
tual conflicts were sufficiently material to require resolution at trial.
While concluding that the denial of qualified immunity on summary
5. Austin, 945 F.2d at 1158.
6. Id. at 1158 n.2. The court has rarely entertained a case which required a specific
identification of the applicable constitutional standard. See, e.g., Martin v. County Board of
Commissioners, 909 F.2d 402, 407 n.5 (10th Cir. 1990) (qualified immunity rejected
though controlling constitutional standard not specified because questioned conduct violated potentially applicable standard); Griess v. Colorado, 841 F.2d 1042, 1047 (10th Cir.
1988) (deciding the immunity question without setting forth the constitutional standard
because of the "special nature of the violations asserted.").
7. Austin, 945 F.2d at 1158.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1157.
10. Id.
11. The denial of qualified immunity was reviewed de novo as a final decision under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988). See, e.g., Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1990);
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); McEvoy v. Shoemaker, 882 F.2d 463, 465
(10th Cir. 1989).
12. See, e.g., Ewing v. Amoco Oil Co., 823 F.2d 1432, 1437 (10th Cir. 1987).
13. Austin, 945 F.2d at 1155.
14. Id (citing Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 701-02 (10th Cir. 1990)).
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judgment was not enigmatic, the court noted an "analytical snarl" regarding whether the Fourth Amendment standard 1 5 or the substantive
due process standard was the operative standard to apply in claims involving post-arrest excessive force and regarding which constitutional
standard should govern qualified immunity under the circumstances of
the Austin case.
The controlling constitutional standard for evaluating the defendants' conduct must be determined whenever qualified immunity is asserted.' 6 Since there is no generic standard applicable to all excessive
force claims,' 7 a court must first place defendant's objectionable conduct somewhere along the custodial continuum to determine the applicable standard. The "custodial continuum" runs from initial arrest or
seizure ("stage 1") to post-arrest but pre-charge or pre-hearing custody
to pre-trial detention ("stage 2") to post conviction incarceration
("stage 3").18 The court summarily dismissed the defendants' argument
that all questioned conduct took place prior to arrest,' 9 stating that it
would be doubtful that the arrest took twelve hours to accomplish, "as
for example might be the case in an extended chase of the sort encountered in cinema ... ."20 The court then concluded that at least some of
defendants' conduct took place at the second stage on the custodial continuum and should be evaluated by the constitutional standard applicable at that point. The court also discussed whether the Fourth
Amendment continues to protect individuals against the deliberate use
of excessive force after the arrest and pretrial detention begin. The
court of appeals observed the Supreme Court's purposeful avoidance of
a direct ruling 2 ' on this same issue in Grahamv. Connor,22 but also noted
the Court's recognition of the "broad applicability of fourth amendment
standards ... applicable to post-arrest police conduct." 23 Before the
Supreme Court's decision in Graham, the lower federal courts had drastically divergent views with regard to the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment after an initial arrest. 24 While the question is still open for
15. The Tenth Circuit stated that "[a]s a general matter, claims based on the use of
excessive force during arrest are now governed by the objective reasonableness standard
of the fourth amendment." Id. at 1158.
16. Id. at 1158 n.2 (citing Spielman v. Hildebrand, 873 F.2d 1377, 1385 (10th Cir.
1989)).
17. See, e.g., Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[d]uring arrest
force must be reasonable, between arrest and conviction government may not punish without due process of law, and after conviction government may not inflict cruel and unusual
punishment"). See also infra note 24.
18. See Gonzales v. City of Espanola, 946 F.2d 901 (10th Cir. 1991); Austin, 945 F.2d
1155, 1158 (10th Cir. 1991).
19. Austin, 945 F.2d at 1159.
20. Il
21. Id.
22. 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989).
23. Austin, 945 F.2d at 1159.
24. See, e.g., Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 192-95 (7th Cir. 1989) (fourth amendment
protection ends and substantive due process protection starts once the initial arrest or
seizure has been completed); Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 382-83 and n.4 (4th Cir.
1987) (substantive due process standard is applicable to excessive force claims where the
conduct is alleged to have occurred post-arrest), vacated, 490 U.S. 1087 (1989); Robin v.
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debate, 25 many of the lower courts have applied the Fourth Amendment
standard to claims of post-arrest use of force in consideration of Graham. 26 The Austin court recognized the Fourth Amendment's limitations
on both duration of detention and judicial determination of probable
cause 2 7 and concluded that the Fourth Amendment also protects the
arrestee detained without a warrant.
The court also discussed whether the Fourth Amendment standard
was "clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct" 28 and
whether it should be used to assess defendants' qualified immunity defense. The court noted that before Graham, the Supreme Court announced the applicable standard for governing the situation that
developed in this case: law enforcement officers must be objectively reasonable in their searches and seizures. 2 9 The court concluded that in
post-Graham cases involving conduct that took place before the Graham
decision was announced, the Fourth Amendment should be applied to
assess qualified immunity only when the plaintiff's claim is based on the
Fourth Amendment. 30 However, when Fourth Amendment claims have
not been specifically asserted, the substantive due process standard will
determine the viability of a qualified immunity defense. In Austin, the
court's holding that Fourth Amendment protections continue postarrest did not reflect law clearly established at the time of the alleged
conduct. 3 ' As a result, the court held that the substantive due process
standard was the "appropriate yardstick" for evaluating a qualified immunity claim for post-arrest conduct.3 2 Before Austin, there were two
distinct standards applied at various points along the custodial continuum to determine the existence of qualified immunity. The Austin case
is significant because it clearly establishes that the constitutionality of
any law enforcement agent's entire course of conduct, regardless of
Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 1985) (notion of "continuing custody" makes
Fourth Amendment standard applicable throughout the custodial continuum); McDowell
v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1303-04, 1306 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying Fourth Amendment
standard to facts similar to those in Austin).
25. Compare Henson v. Thezan, 717 F. Supp. 1330, 1336-36 (N.D. Il. 1989) (holding
that Fourth Amendment applies to all stages of the custodial continuum prior to probable
cause hearing) with Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that
Fourth Amendment standard applies until formal charge or arraignment).
The Ninth Circuit is in accord with the Second Circuit, and applies the Fourth Amendment standard to all claims of post-arrest use of excessive force. See, e.g., Hammer v. Gross,
884 F.2d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated en banc on other grounds, 932 F.2d 842, 845 n.1
and 850-51 (1991).
26. Id.
27. The court concluded:
j]ust as the fourth amendment's strictures continue in effect to set the applicable
constitutional limitations regarding both duration (reasonable period under the
circumstances of arrest) and legal justification (judicial determination of probable cause), its protections also persist to impose restrictions on the treatment of
the arrestee detained without a warrant.
Austin, 945 F.2d at 1160 (emphasis added).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See supra notes 22 and 23 and accompanying text.
32. Austin, 945 F.2d at 1162.
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where along the custodial continuum the conduct occurs, is to be evaluated under the Fourth Amendment objective standard.

II. DELAY IN APPEAL
Several Tenth Circuit decisions in 1991 strongly invited the
Oklahoma Attorney General, Oklahoma Public Defenders Office, and
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals to work together to solve the "systematic delays" encountered by indigent clients appealing lower court
decisions through the Oklahoma Public Defender's Office. 33 The
lengthy delay appellants face when enlisting the aid of the public defender's office was the subject of five separate actions in 1991, the most
significant being Harris v. Champion.3 4 In the Harris decision, the Tenth
Circuit remanded three similar cases on the same issue for reconsideration in light of its decision and subsequently remanded another case appealed after the Harris decision.
In Harris, petitioner was sentenced to serve consecutively one fifteen-year term and one five-year term for assault and battery. Upon being sentenced on September 29, 1988, he invoked his right of appeal
and requested that counsel be appointed. On May 18, 1989 the
Oklahoma Public Defender's Office filed an Application for Late Appeal,
which was granted. On April 16, 1990, over one year later, petitioner
received a letter from the Defender's Office setting forth the approximate time frame for filing a brief in support of his appeal. 35 On May 22,
1990, while his state appeal was still pending, petitioner filed a habeas
corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma alleging both constitutional deficiencies in his trial
and violations of due process, equal protection and right to counsel related to the delays in getting the Public Defender's Office to prepare his
appellate brief.3 6 The State moved to dismiss the petition for failure to
exhaust available state remedies. 3 7 The federal district court adopted
the magistrate's recommendation and dismissed the petition without
prejudice.
Before discussing the merits of petitioner's argument, the court first
33. Id. at 1071.
34. 938 F.2d 1062 (10th Cir. 1991).
35. The letter read in pertinent part:
You will receive a copy of anything this office files in the Court of Criminal Appeals in your behalf. So far there has been a petition and an extension filed.
There will be nothing else filed except extensions until we are able to prepare
your brief or the court issues a final extension.... It will be at least three years
before we are able to file your brief with the court.
Id. at 1064.

36. Id.
37. Before filing a habeas corpus action, a petitioner must exhaust all viable state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) sets forth the circumstances under which a court may grant a
habeas corpus petition:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus... shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process, or the
existence of circumstances renderingsuch process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
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addressed the exhaustion requirement and the established exceptions,
noting the well-recognized view that a prisoner has no obligation to exhaust his state remedies wherever there has been an excessive and un38
justified delay in his appeal or post-conviction proceeding.
Respondent asserted that the petitioner should not be excused from exhausting his state remedies because the delay was caused by "petitioner's counsel's present request for extensions which have been
granted." 3 9 The court rejected respondent's syllogistic argument, and
held that the inability of the public defender to handle Harris' case in a
timely fashion could not be attributed to the indigent petitioner. 40 As
the Supreme Court held in Barker v. Wingo,4 1 "the ultimate responsibility
' 42
While
... must rest with the government rather than the defendant."
the court sympathized with the heavy demands on the Public Defender's
Office, 4 3 it held that there was insufficient justification to withhold federal relief until the petitioner has exhausted his "inordinately-delayed
'4 4
state remedies."
The exhaustion of state remedies requirement, set forth in 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b), is a matter of comity-not an absolute limitation on
federal courts' jurisdiction. 4 5 The Harris court went further to say that
even if the Public Defender's Office were now to accelerate the projected
time-table for filing the brief, the pre-existing delay might, by itself, be
sufficient to abate the exhaustion requirement. However, the court remained sensitive to the comity issue and expressed its desire to maintain
38. DONALD E. WILKES, FEDERAL AND STATE POSTCONVlCTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF,

§§ 8-19 (1987). The court also cited cases from seven circuits that are in full accord on
this issue: Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[A] prisoner need not
fully exhaust his state remedies if the root of his complaint is his inability to do so.");
Elcock v. Henderson, 902 F.2d 219, 220 (2d Cir. 1990); Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d
1208, 1221 (3rd Cir. 1987); Okot v. Callahan, 788 F.2d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 1986) (If defendant receives inadequate redress in state court proceeding, he may file a habeas corpus
action in federal court.); Cook v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 749 F.2d 678,
680 (11 th Cir. 1985) ("State remedies will be found ineffective and a federal habeas corpus
petitioner will be excused from exhausting them in the case of unreasonable, unexplained
state delays in acting on the petitioner's motion for state relief."); Pool v. Wyrick, 703 F.2d
1064, 1066 (8th Cir. 1983); Shelton v. Heard, 696 F.2d 1127, 1128-29 (5th Cir. 1983);
Dozie v. Cady, 430 F.2d 637, 638 (7th Cir. 1970).
39. Harris, 938 F.2d at 1065.
40. Id.
41. 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972). Although the Barker case dealt with delay of an initial
hearing, it has been applied uniformly to cases involving delays in sentencing and delays in
appeals with facts similar to those in the Harris case.
42. Id.
43. Harris, 938 F.2d at 1066.
44. Id.
45. In Shelton v. Heard, 696 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1983), the court held:
[T]he requirement to exhaust state remedies is not a jurisdictional limitation on
the federal courts. Rather it is a matter of comity between the federal and state
courts. The forbearance of the federal courts is based upon the assumption that
the state remedies available to the petitioner are adequate and effective to vindicate federal constitutional rights. When those state procedures become ineffective or inadequate, the foundation of the exhaustion requirement is undercut and
the federal courts may take action.
Shelton, 696 F.2d at 1128 (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 516 n.7 (1982) and Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 433-34 (1963)).
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an incentive for states to remedy unreasonable delays. 4 6
The Harris court, without deciding the merits of petitioner's
claims, 4 7 enumerated several constitutional concerns to guide the district court in determining whether a petitioner should be required to
exhaust all available state remedies. First, the court should look at the
absolute length of time required to complete the direct appeal process.
In the Harriscase, the court determined that it would take four and onehalf years from the time Harris' appeal was docketed plus an indeterminate amount of time before his case would be set for argument. 48 Second, the court should look to the length of the appellate process relative
to the length of the sentence in determining whether the habeas corpus
petition should be granted. 4 9 This factor is not determinative since a
prisoner serving a shorter sentence, subjected to even reasonable delay,
might have completed his sentence by the time the appeal can be heard.
This approach balances the potential conflict caused by a bypass of comity with the reduced effectiveness of habeas corpus actions caused by
requiring petitioners to exhaust all state remedies. 50 Third, the court
should address any equal protection ramifications of forcing indigent
prisoners to suffer extraordinary delays solely because of their financial
status: "There can be no equal justice where the kind of appeal a man
enjoys 'depends on the amount of money he has.'-51 While absolute
equality is not required, the fact that an appeal is being delayed for the
52
indigent and for no one else may implicate an equal protection issue.
Fourth, in considering whether to accept a habeas corpus request from a
petitioner who has not yet fully exhausted state remedies, the court
should look to the due process implications of an alleged delay. The
Harris court noted that many courts analyze state appellate delay due
process terms, 53 and have recognized that delay of the post-conviction
process may be a denial of due process. 54 Fifth, the court turned to the
effect a delay in appellate process might have on'the right to effective
counsel. 5 5 Again, this concern, balances petitioner's constitutional
46. Harris, 938 F.2d at 1067 (citing Layne v. Gunter, 559 F.2d 850, 851-52 (Ist Cir.
1977)) ("In this delicate area of comity, bright line rules are not the answer. The objective
is not for one judicial system to score points against the other, but to assure expeditious
justice to individuals and to retain all incentives for both the state and federal systems to
labor toward that end.").
47. Id. at n.5.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. The State argued that "in all likelihood the appeal will be decided during the time
which petitioner is incarcerated," and that "the fact that petitioner may have finished serving his sentence when his appeal is denied does not render the appeal moot." Id. at n.4.
The court rejected these arguments primarily because one of petitioner's claims was that
he was sentenced under the wrong statute, and thus should have received a lesser
sentence.
51. Id. at 1067 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956)).
52. Id at 1068. ("[A]n insistence upon further exhaustion of state remedies would
inappropriately subjugate petitioner's constitutional rights to the concerns of comity.").
53. Id.
54. Id. (citing Kelly v. Crouse, 352 F.2d 506 (10th Cir. 1965)); Smith v. Kansas, 356
F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 871 (1967)).
55. The right to effective counsel and the equal protection concerns expressed by the
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rights 5 6 with comity concerns.
After suggesting these constitutional guideposts, the court of appeals turned to the matter of relief for independent claims stemming
from the delay in process. When, as in Harris,the petitioner alleges trial
error as well as an independent basis for relief, such as denial of due
process, the federal district court should hear the independent claim
without requiring an exhaustion of state remedies, because "[i]t would
be meaningless to insist that petitioner exhaust his state remedies when
the essence of his due process claim arises directly out of his inability to
do so."'5 7 On the other hand, when a petitioner only alleges federal constitutional errors at his state trial, comity requires the petitioner to exhaust state court remedies unless he can show inordinate, excessive and
unexcusable delay." 5 8 If such circumstances exist, a federal court may
hear the merits of the constitutional trial error claim and any independent claim stemming from the delay.
When a federal court hears a habeas corpus action, either after exhaustion of state remedies or by waiving the requirement, the court may
order a wide range of remedies. The court may order the prisoner's
immediate release, 5 9 release if an appeal is not heard within a relatively
61
short time, 60 or release on bail until the state appeal is heard.
Although in Harris the court of appeals left the selection of an appropriate remedy to the district court, the survey of available relief was no
doubt aimed at convincing all involved state departments to cooperate
with the court's determination.
The Harris court made five orders. First, it reversed the district
court's dismissal of petitioner's habeas corpus action for failure to exhaust state court remedies. 62 Second, it ordered that two other cases,
Bunton v. Cowley 63 and Hacker v. Saffle,64 along with any other pending
court are interwoven. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), in whichJustice
Douglas held that indigent defendants were denied equal protection where plaintiff's appeals were decided without the benefit of counsel.
56. In Douglas, the Supreme Court held that when there is a denial of effective
counsel:
[Tihere is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where
the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination
into the record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments on his behalf,
while the indigent, already burdened by a preliminary determination that his case
is without merit, is forced to shift for himself. The indigent, where the record is
unclear or the errors ares only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich
man has a meaningful appeal.
Id at 358-59.
57. Harris, 938 F.2d 1062, 1069 (10th Cir. 1991). See also Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d
528 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that excessive delay in obtaining an appeal may constitute a
due process violation and that a prisoner need not exhaust state court remedies before
seeking redress for the independent due process claim).
58. Harris, 938 F.2d at 1069.
59. See, e.g., Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208 (3rd Cir. 1987).
60. See Coe, 922 F.2d at 533.
61. See Rivera v. Concepcion, 469 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1972).
62. Harris, 938 F.2d at 1071.
63. 936 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1991).
64. 936 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1991).
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habeas corpus actions, be consolidated for reconsideration in light of
the Harris opinion. 65 Third, the court ordered that the district court
conduct a full hearing into possible systematic delays of the Oklahoma
Public Defender's Office in the preparation and filing of appeals for the
indigent, 66 stating that all parties should work together to suggest solutions to correct any constitutional deficiencies caused by the appellate
delay. 6 7 Fourth, the court ordered the district court to make detailed
findings of fact and conclusions of law and to issue appropriate remedies
for all constitutional violations. 68 Fifth, the court ordered that experienced counsel be appointed to represent the petitioners in the collec69
tively remanded cases.
The Harris case was recently extended to cover claims for declara70
tory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Richards v. Bellmon.
While a habeas corpus action, challenging the fact of conviction or the
conditions or duration of the confinement, requires an exhaustion of
state remedies, a § 1983 action has no such requirement. 7 1 The court
emphasized that relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is available to challenge
the conditions of confinement or to seek declaratory judgment as a
72
predicate to an award of monetary damages or injunctive relief.

Although the court refused to interfere with the petitioner's tactical
choice to proceed under § 1983 as opposed to habeas corpus, the court
instructed the district court to "be mindful of the statements contained
in our order on rehearing in Harris," 73 implying that the petitioner, if
successful, could recover damages to compensate for the backlog in the
Public Defender's Office that delayed his appeal.
III.

COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL

In Lafferty v. Cook, 74 the Tenth Circuit applied the Supreme Court's
decision in Dusky v. United States 7 5 to determine a defendant's competence to stand trial. While the Lafferty case does not represent a new
approach to competency determinations in the Tenth Circuit, the case is
significant in that it represents the first time the court has addressed the
constitutional implications of a defendant's refusal to raise the insanity
defense despite strong evidence of insanity.
65. Due to venue considerations, this order was later vacated and the cases were consolidated and remanded to the correct district within Oklahoma. Harris, 938 F.2d at 107273.
66. Id. at 1071.

67. Although the Attorney General objected to this order because of her status as a
party in the action, the court issued a sharply worded denial: "One would think that the
Attorney General's Office would want to be represented at a hearing where such matters
are under review." Id. at 1072.
68. Id. at 1071.
69.

l.

70. 941 F.2d 1015 (10th Cir. 1991).
71. Id. at 1018 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499-500 (1973)).
72. Id.

73. Id. at 1019.
74. 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991).
75. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
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Before committing the acts for which he was convicted, Ronald Lafferty was excommunicated from the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints because of his unorthodox religious views, 76 which eventually led to marital difficulties and a divorce from his wife. 7 7 Lafferty's
sister-in-law, Brenda, apparently encouraged Lafferty's wife to take their
infant daughter and leave Lafferty.
Lafferty, his brother, and two other men who shared Lafferty's religious views participated in prayer meetings, at which they discussed the
"removal" of Brenda and her infant daughter. 78 While under the influence of a religious revelation, Lafferty, his brother and the two other
men drove to Brenda's house, and Lafferty and his brother went inside
and killed both Brenda and her infant daughter, while the other two
men waited in the car.
After the state court initially determined that Lafferty was competent to stand trial, defendant's counsel filed notice that he planned to
present an insanity defense. 7 9 Under Utah state law, a defendant must
cooperate in a pre-trial mental evaluation to avail himself of the insanity
defense.8 0 Lafferty refused to cooperate because he did not consider
himself insane and did not understand that he would not be allowed to
use expert testimony at trial from an expert who had examined him during the initial competency proceeding. 8 ' Defendant's failure to cooperate with the requisite mental examination led the court to disallow the
presentation of the insanity defense at trial. The court reserved ruling
on whether the expert testimony would be admissible during trial on the
defense of manslaughter due to diminished mental capacity.8 2 Although
the trial court eventually allowed the expert testimony for the manslaughter defense, defendant refused to let his counsel present the evidence because he contended that his mental capacity was not diminished
when he committed the homicides.8 3 Lafferty was convicted of capital
76. Lafferty, 949 F.2d at 1548.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2. According to UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-3 (1) (1991):
When a defendant proposes to offer evidence that he is not guilty as a result of
insanity or that he had diminished mental capacity or any other testimony of
mental health expert to establish mental state, he shall, at the time of arraignment
or as soon afterward as practicable, but not fewer than 30 days before trial, file
and serve the prosecuting attorney with written notice of his intention to claim
the defense.
80. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-4 (2) (1991) sets forth in relevant part:
The defendant shall make himself available and fully cooperate in the examination by the department and any other independent examiners for the defense and
the prosecuting attorney. If the defendant fails to make himself available and
fully cooperate, and that failure is established to the satisfaction of the court at a
hearing prior to trial, the defendant is barred from presenting expert testimony
relating to his defense of mental illness at the trial of the case ....
81. Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1549 (10th Cir. 1991).
82. Id.
83. Id. At this point in the trial, defense counsel attempted to file a motion to withdraw; however, defendant advised the court that if he represented himself, he would argue
that the court had no jurisdiction because he had been commanded by God to commit the
homicides. Id. at n.5.
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murder and sentenced to death.8 4
After his conviction and sentencing were affirmed on direct appeal,8 5 defendant filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district
court. During the habeas corpus action, the federal district court discovered that several of the transcripts of the state court proceedings were
omitted from the record on appeal and suggested filing a petition for

rehearing in state court.8 6 The Utah Supreme Court held that the transcripts did not warrant a change in its prior ruling.8 7 The federal district

court subsequently denied Lafferty's habeas corpus petition, and Lafferty appealed.
When a federal court hears a habeas corpus action challenging a
state court's determination, the federal court must presume the state
court's factual findings correct, unless the federal court concludes that
the fact determination is not supported by the record.8 8 The court of
appeals determined that competency is an issue of fact 8 9 and set out to
determine whether the state court applied the correct legal standard,
and if so, whether its determination was supported by the record. 90
The court of appeals concluded that since competence to stand trial
is an aspect of due process, 9 1 the Constitution requires one gauge
against which to measure, because of his mental condition, a defendant's
due process rights are violated by requiring him to stand trial."' 92 The
court of appeals observed that the correct standard to use in making a
competency determination was set forth by the Supreme Court in Dusky

9
v. United States: 3

[I]t is not enough for the district judge to find that 'the defendant [is] oriented to time and place and [has] some recollection
of events,' but that the 'test must be whether he has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
94
him.'
After Dusky, the Tenth Circuit has used this "sufficient contact with reality test" as "the touchstone for ascertaining the existence of rational un84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988).
Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d-1546, 1548 (10th Cir. 1991).
State v. Lafferty, 776 P.2d 631 (Utah 1989).

88. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8) (1988).
89. In Demosthenes v. Baal, 110 S. Ct. 2223, 2225 (1990), the Supreme Court held,
"a state court's determination on the merits of a factual issue are entitled to a presumption
of correctness on habeas corpus review. We have held that a state court's conclusion regarding a defendant's competency is entitled to such a presumption."
90. Lafferty, 949 F.2d at 1548.
91. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966); Coleman v. Saffle, 912 F.2d 1217,
1224 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 22 (1990).
92. Lafferty, 949 F.2d at 1550.
93. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (percuriam).
94. Id. at 402. While Dusky was a federal prosecution, this test is equally applicable to
habeas corpus determinations. See, e.g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Coleman
v. Saffle, 912 F.2d 1217, 1224 & n.8 (10th Cir. 1990).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LI W REVIEW

[Vol. 69:4

derstanding." 9 5 The state court rejected the mental examiners'
conclusion that Lafferty was incompetent to stand trial because their
conclusions "rested almost entirely on the 1960 case of Dusky v. United
'9 6
States, and that they have misapplied the law enunciated in that case."
The state court went on to say that "Dusky is a very short per curiam
opinion with no underlying facts stated therein, and it is not possible to
ascertain from the opinion the context in which the words relied upon
by the examiners were used." 97 The court of appeals commented that
the state court's findings "reveal unambiguously that the state trial
court's evaluation of Lafferty's competency was infected by a misperception of the legal requirements set out in Dusky .... ,,98 The court of
appeals concluded that the state court had failed to use the Dusky test,
and thus that the state court's determination of competence was not
supported by the record and that the presumption of correctness of the
state court's factual findings set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) did not
apply.9 9
After rejecting the presumption of correctness, the court of appeals
noted that all of the expert testimony and evidence presented at the pretrial competence proceedings were consistent in showing Lafferty "unable to make decisions on the basis of a realistic evaluation of his own
best interests." 10 0 While a defendant operating under a paranoid delusional system may contend that he is not mentally ill and refuse to present an appropriate defense, "this result cannot be reconciled with the
requirements of due process." 10 1 Accordingly, Lafferty's writ for
habeas corpus was granted and his sentence and conviction were
vacated.
The holding in Lafferty is significant to the Tenth Circuit because it
requires a defendant to assert an insanity defense despite the defendant's persistent objections. The case holds that the Constitution requires the court to instruct the jury on the insanity defense independent
of the defendant's wishes if evidence supports a finding that the defendant is insane.
IV.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

In 1991, the Tenth Circuit decided one case that impacted the law
95. Lafferty, 949 F.2d at 1551. While the majority in Lafferty cited several Tenth Circuit
cases to establish the proposition that the defendant must have a sufficient contact with
reality, the dissent contended that the cited cases were factually distinguishable, and did
not require such a finding. Id. at n.3.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1977) provides that in a federal habeas corpus proceeding,
the state court's determinations of factual issues should, under most circumstances, be
presumed correct if the findings were made by a court of competent jurisdiction after a
full, fair and adequate hearing, and where the facts at issue were fully developed.
100. Lafferty, 949 F.2d at 1555.
101. Id. at 9.
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of double jeopardy within the circuit. 10 2 This decision, discussed below,
reflects the court's willingness to follow the United States Supreme
Court in granting criminal defendants greater protection under the law.
As this cases demonstrates, it is now more difficult for the state to prosecute a defendant twice when the alleged crimes stem from the same
conduct.
In United States v. Koonce,10 3 the Tenth Circuit addressed two significant double jeopardy issues: first, whether the Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibits the conviction and sentencing for possession of an illegal substance where the same possession was used in an earlier proceeding to
increase the sentence; and second, whether the Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibits the conviction and sentencing of a felon in possession of a firearm, where the same possession was used in an earlier proceeding to
increase the sentence.
Koonce distributed methamphetamine from his home in Monticello, Utah. In late 1987, one of Koonce's customers pled guilty to distribution charges and named Koonce as his supplier. Koonce was
eventually charged in the United States District Court for the District of
South Dakota with one count of distributing methamphetamine.10 4 A
jury found Koonce guilty of distributing 443 grams of
methamphetamine within South Dakota.' 0 5 At the sentencing proceeding, the prosecution introduced evidence of the methamphetamine and
firearms found at Koonce's home in Utah.' 0 6 Koonce's ultimate sentence was not based solely upon the 443 grams he mailed into South
Dakota, but upon a total of 7,869 grams of methamphetamine he
owned. 10 7 Koonce received a twenty-year sentence in a maximum se102. In another case, the Tenth Circuit held that felony counts listed in a second indictment stemmed from the same conduct that triggered a single-count conviction one year
earlier, thereby violating the law of doublejeopardy. See United States v. Felix, 926 F.2d
1522, 1524 (10th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112,S.Ct. 1377 (1991); see also U.S. v. Felix, 867 F.2d
1068 (8th Cir. 1989). The Tenth Circuit showed a willingness to increase the protections
afforded to criminal defendants in the area of double jeopardy by following Grady v. Corbin,
495 U.S. 508 (1990). Under the Grady analysis, a court asks whether the government must
prove conduct in the second case that constitutes an offense for which the defendant was
already tried. Grady, 495 U.S. at 511; see also Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980) (distinguishing same conduct from actual evidence). The focus is upon the defendant's conduct,
not the evidence used by the state to prove the defendant's conduct. Many of the circuit
courts that have addressed Grady limited the case to its facts. See, eg. United States v.
Calderone and Catalano, 917 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that "same conduct" test
applies to double jeopardy claims occurring within successive prosecutions); cf. United
States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that the Grady decision does not
apply in the RICO context). Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court recently reversed the Tenth Circuit's decision in the Felix case, further limiting the Grady precedent to
certain factual contexts. See United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992) on remand to
United States v. Felix, - F.2d _, 1992 WL 105467 (10th Cir., May 21, 1992) (No. 897058).
103. 945 F.2d 1145 (10th Cir. 1991).
104. Id at 1146. Koonce was charged pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1988).
He was tried in South Dakota after mailing a quantity of methamphetamine into the state.
105. ld
106. Ide
107. It The conviction was enhanced by two levels, reflecting the firearms Koonce
possessed and his history as a criminal.
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curity prison, five years of supervised release, and a fine of $50,000.108
Following the conviction in South Dakota, the United States
charged Koonce in the United States District Court for the District of
Utah with intent to distribute the methamphetamine found in Koonce's
Utah residence and possession of a firearm by a felon.' 0 9 The district
court refused to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds,
and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. 1 0
Koonce was ultimately found guilty of all charges and appealed his conviction to the Tenth Circuit. By the time his appeal was heard in the
Tenth Circuit, the United States Supreme Court had decided United
States v. Grady."1 1
The Tenth Circuit ultimately held that the Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibits a subsequent prosecution, even when the earlier use of possession evidence was used only in a sentencing proceeding." 2 In reaching
its decision, the court employed a three-step analysis. First, the court
1
found that Koonce was punished for the first possession conviction, 3
and that both the Utah and South Dakota proceedings punished Koonce
for the same conduct. Absent specific congressional design, this
presents significant double jeopardy implications under Grady. 114 Second, the court determined that there was no congressional intent that a
defendant like Koonce receive cumulative punishment for the same conduct and that Congress intended to have illicit drug charges combined
into a single punishment, not broken into separate offenses. 1 5 Third,
the court looked at whether the punishment imposed by the Utah district court constituted double punishment under the Double Jeopardy
Clause, given the concurrent punishments. 1 16 Citing Ball v. United
States,117 the court held that concurrent punishment does not make
double punishment constitutional under the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 118
The second issue, whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits
the conviction for possession of a firearm when the possession was used
108. Koonce's sentence was the maximum allowed under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1988).
109. Koonce, 945 F.2d at 1147-48.
110. See United States v. Koonce, 885 F.2d 720, 722 (10th Cir. 1989). The Tenth Circuit remanded the case back to the district court for trial.
111. 495 U.2. 508 (1990).
112. Koonce, 945 F.2d at 1155.
113. Id at 1149.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1151. See also U.S.S.G. ch.1, pt. A, 4(a) (showing that the sentencing guidelines were constructed in an effort to eliminate charge/count manipulation). The sentencing and punishment components of the Double Jeopardy Clause are backed by legislative
intent. The Constitution does not prohibit Congress from punishing each step leading to
the full crime, where Congress possesses the authority to set punishment for the full
crime. See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985).
116. Koonce, 945 F.2d at 1151.
117. 470 U.S. 856, 861 (1985).

118. Koonce, 945 F.2d at 1153 (defining punishment under Ball to include all consequences of a conviction, not just incarceration times or fines and holding the absence of an
additional prison term is in no way persuasive of the constitutionality of a second
conviction).
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to increase an earlier sentence, received only cursory treatment from the
court. Applying the traditional Blockburger 119 test, the court found that
in this case the firearm sentencing enhancement charge and possession
charge each required proof of different elements.' 20 The firearm sentencing enhancement requires that the accused be in possession of the
firearm and that possession occur during the commission of the narcotics offense. The "possession by a felon" charge, in Utah, requires that
the accused possessed a firearm and was a felon during possession. Accordingly, the court rejected the second contention of double jeopardy
without further analysis.
This opinion establishes that there is no legitimate reason to bring a
separate proceeding against a defendant when an enhanced punishment
was given in an earlier proceeding.' 2 1 Even though there is no direct
ban against the prosecution under the Double Jeopardy Clause, there is
such a ban against additional punishment in the second proceeding.
V.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

The Tenth Circuit heard several cases on the issue of search and
seizure during 1991, most of which either affirmed the existing law or
rejected search and seizure appeals on other grounds. 122 One decision,
United States v. Walker,12 is significant for its strong denunciation of random automobile stops by the police and for defining the appropriate
standard of review in such cases.
Walker was stopped for speeding and asked to produce a valid
driver's license and vehicle registration. Although his hands shook
slightly when removing the license from his wallet, there was no reason
1 24
for the police officer to believe that Walker had committed a crime.
Rather than issue a speeding citation, the officer questioned Walker
about various crimes unrelated to the traffic stop and asked whether
there were any controlled substances, weapons, open containers of alcohol, or large amounts of cash in the vehicle. Walker admitted only that

he was carrying $1750 in cash. Upon the officer's request, Walker gave
permission to search the vehicle. In the trunk, the officer found kilogram packages of cocaine.' 2 5 After the defendant's arrest, the police
obtained a search warrant and discovered 86 kilogram packages of co119. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). The Blockburger test examines
the statutory elements of the charged offenses. If the elements of the offenses are the
same, or if one is a lessor included offense of the other, the charges must be brought in
one prosecution. A subsequent prosecution for an offense not charged in the first prosecution will result in a finding of double jeopardy under the Blockburger analysis.
120. Koonce, 945 F.2d at 1154.
121. Id at 1154 n.10.
122. See, e.g., United States v. Dodds, 946 F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1991) (affirming defendant's conviction and holding that he had no standing to challenge the police officer's actions on search and seizure grounds).
123. 941 F.2d 1086 (10th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Walker 1].
124. United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 813 (10th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Walker
Ill.
125. Id. at 814.
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caine in the automobile. 126 The United States District Court for the
District of Utah suppressed all of the evidence of cocaine in accordance
with the Tenth Circuit's 1988 decision in United States v. Guzman. 12 7 Guzman held that the defendant's apparent anxiety did not raise sufficient
suspicion to justify the lengthy detention. 128 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's analysis but vacated and remanded the
case to allow the district court to decide whether the search was justified
by the "totality of the circumstances." 1 29 The district court found no
justification for the search, and the State petitioned the Tenth Circuit
for rehearing. The petition was denied. The denial of rehearing is significant, as it affirms the importance of the Guzman decision in analyzing
when a stop of an automobile shifts from a simple Terry 10 stop to a
formal seizure.
Guzman involved an automobile stop for failure to wear a seat
belt. 13 1 Although the police officer had no reason to suspect further
criminal activity, he continued to ask the defendants intrusive questions
unrelated to the traffic stop. The Tenth Circuit held that the detention
of the driver and passenger of the automobile was unreasonable, especially when the driver produced a valid driver's license and had valid
registration for the vehicle.13 2 United States v. Walker is almost factually
identical to the Guzman case, and thus it does not present a change in
search and seizure law within the Tenth Circuit. The Walker decision
demonstrates the court's resolve to denounce random stops by police
officers where the intrusiveness of the stop moves beyond the "ordinary.' 3 3 The court held that when the intrusiveness of a police officer's
questioning moves beyond "mere inconvenience," there is almost no
3 4
justification for the seizure absent an objective reasonable suspicion.'
The limited circumstances where seizure is permitted absent such rea35
sonable suspicion were not present in Walker.'
The petition for rehearing contended that an individual driving a
car on public roads or highways has less of an expectation of privacy
126. Id.
127. 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Walker, 751 F. Supp. 199
(D. Utah 1990) [hereinafter Walker III].
128. Walker III, 751 F. Supp. at 204.
129. Walker II, 933 F.2d at 817.
130. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (scope of a search subsequent to the stop of an
automobile limited to what was minimally necessary to determine whether the defendants
were armed.).
131. Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1519.
132. Id
133. Walker 1, 941 F.2d at 1089. The court acknowledged that more leeway is allowed
when the stop is a systematic checkpoint stop. The instant case focuses upon random
stops or individual stops, which the Supreme Court denounced in United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
134. Walker 1, 941 F.2d at 1089. The objective and reasonable suspicion standard was
set forth by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
135. For examples of where such exceptions arise, see Treasury Employees v. Von
Rabb, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976);
Michigan State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979).
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than does an individual in a private residence.' 3 6 The Tenth Circuit,
while recognizing the general validity of the argument, rejected its application in the instant case, citing Delaware v. Prouse.13 7 Prouse held that
motorists do not lose their reasonable expectations of privacy solely be13 8
cause they are in an automobile subject to heightened regulation.
The court reasoned that moving from a stop for a speeding violation to
intrusive questioning about drug trafficking and large amounts of cash
39
clearly implicates Fourth Amendment privacy interests.'
Finally, United States v. Walker is notable for defining the appropriate
standard of review when an officer's reasonable suspicions are questioned. The reviewing court must accept the trial court's determination
as to whether a reasonable
and objective suspicion existed, unless
"clearly erroneous." 14 0 The court found nothing erroneous in the district court's determination, and thus denied appellant's petition for
rehearing. 141
VI.

CONCLUSION

During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit did not drastically

change the law of criminal procedure. However, several cases decided
during 1991 gave further insight into areas of criminal procedure that
were previously unclear or undefined. While these cases did not seem
to support any definitive trend in the circuit, it is certain that future decisions will continue to conservatively explore and clarify the constitutional limitations on the law of criminal procedure.
David B. Lee
Todd A. Noteboom

136. Walker I, 941 F.2d at 1089.
137. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
138. Walker I, 941 F.2d at 1089.
139. Ia at 1090.
140. Ia The court also noted that there is a split among the circuits on this issue. See,
e.g., United States v. Peoples, 925 F.2d 1082, 1085 (8th Cir. 1991) (clearly erroneous standard applied); United States v. Rose, 889 F.2d 1490, 1496 (6th Cir. 1989) (clearly erroneous standard applied); United States v. Mondello, 927 F.2d 1463, 1470 (9th Cir. 1991) (A
police officer's reasonable suspicion, as a mixed question of law and fact, must be subject
to de novo review by the appellate court.).
141. Walker 1, 941 F.2d at 1090. The court also noted that given its recent decision in
United States v. Turner, 928 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1991), establishing the clearly erroneous
standard, it could not deviate from this precedent with only a three-judge panel.

